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11’ HE MEXICAN economy has experienced a re-
markable evolution in the last decade. Compared to
the western world, Mexico’s rate of growth in this
period was surpassed only by Japan, and the rate of
inflation was low and steady. This is to m-ention only
two of the many economic accomplishments of the
nation that has been referred to as “The Mexican
Miracle,”
For some people, however, the days of the so-
called “Mexican Miracle” seem to be ending, while
for others only temporary difficulties have appeared.
In 1971 the rate of growth of real gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) reached its lowest point since 1955 (3.7
percent) and prices showed a peak rate of increase of
5 percent.’ The question now asked is whether this
situation was just a temporary setback or a sign of
things to come.
This article attempts to provide some insight into
the complexities of the Mexican economy. It serves as
background information to a larger study on the de-
velopment of an econometric model of the Mexican
economy.
Recent Dev-elopments
Gnne Domes-I-ic Prothscl — Mexico has experienced
considerable economic growth in the last 15 years.
‘Gross domestic product is equal to gross national product
minus factor payments to other countries.
Gross domestic product has grown at an average
annual rate of 11 percent, 7 percent in real terms and
4 percent in prices.’ When considering the 3.2 per-
cent rate of population growth, output per capita rose
at a very respectable 3.8 percent rate.3
The composition of GDP has undergone a consid-
erable change in the last 20 years. As a result of im-
port substitution, manufacturing production has
grown considerably in importance at the expense of
agriculture. Over the same period services have
grown and at present represent more than 40 percent
of total GDP.
In spite of the rapid growth and shifts in the com-
position of production, an underlying problem of per-
sistent maldistribution of income has shown no rela-
tive improvement in the past 15 years.4
Pricer and Uaemptoy-ment — Over the last 15 years
the 4 percent annual rate of growth in the implicit
price deflator compares favorably with the 10 percent
yearly average of the previous 15 years. Inflationary
pressures in this earlier period primarily reflected a
rapid growth in Federal expenditures relative to na-
‘The data used throughout this section are from the following
sources: Banco de Mexico S.A., Dimecion General de
Estadistiea, and International Monetary Fund.
3
Output per capita in terms of dollars has grown as follows:
1950 = $183; 1960 = $346; and 1970 = $690.
~I6genia M. de Navarrate, La Distribucion dcl Ingreso ~‘ el
De.sarrollo Fconomieo de Mexico, UNAM (1960).
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tional output. These expenditures were financed by
the creation of “new” money which grew at rates
higher than real GDP.
Stability in the more recent period has been accom-
plished by maintaining balance between Federal ex-
penditures and national output. Monetary authorities
have contributed to this delicate balance by offsetting
pressures emanating from excessive Government ex-
penditures and an important external sector.
The rate of unemployment in Mexico is generally
considered so high that sharp increases in aggregate
demand are assumed not to affect prices, since they
will be absorbed by greater levels of employment.
This assumption can not be proved, however, since
there is no reliable information concerning employ-
ment. As developed later, it will be shown that for
certain instances, full-employment conditions appear










lmzvcstment — Real investment has been the main
source of dynamism in the Mexican economy. Public
as well as private capital formation have made it pos-
sible to achieve an average 17 percent annual rate of
growth in real investment in the last 20 years. Over
that period Government investment, directed mainly
to the development of infrastructure (roads, dams,
electricity, etc.), has comprised about 45 percent of
total investment.
Public Finance — Throughout the past 10 years the
annual rate of growth of total Government expendi-
tures has been 13 percent. This growth is primarily
the result of a public policy to accelerate infrastruc-
ture capital formation and promote social welfare. On
the other hand, revenue has not grown at a rate suffi-
cient to cover total expenditures. Consequently, the
net budget position has been in deficit.
The relatively slow growth in revenue represents a
direct effort by the Government to promote and sus-
tain the growth of private investment, rather than in-
crease Government revenue. Tax exemptions or re-
ductions as well as increased transfer payments have
been used widely to promote private investment,
both domestic and foreign.
Sacings — While Federal Government contributions
to the growth of savings (budget surpluses) have
been negligible, private as well as foreign savings
have been growing at high and steady rates. Gross
national savings grew from 4,735 million pesos in 1950
to 12,442 million in 1958, and to 52,000 mfflion pesos
in 1970.~Savings represented 10 percent of GDP in
1950 and 17 percent in 1970.
5
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The Mexican banking system has been absorbing
greater amounts of these savings in the last 15 years.
Its liabilities have been growing at an average rate of
17 percent annually — a rate considerably higher than
that of GDP. Increased monetization of both real and
financial assets and growing domestic savings per-
mitted this growth in banking liabilities. The favorable
interest rates relative to foreign markets, and a com-
petitive and efficient financial system produced at-
tractive conditions for domestic as well as foreign
investors.
The greater volume of savings received by the
financial system, in turn, has allowed monetary au-
thorities to reallocate private savings to finance Gov-
ernment deficits through the mechanism of required
reserves, instead of issuing “new” money. (Growth of
the money stock has been sustained at an average
annual rate of 10 percent in the last 15 years, the
same rate as nominal GDP.) Although this realloca-
tion process has increased the amount of credit avail-
able to the Government, it also has made the Gov-
ernment more dependent on private banking.
External Sector — One of the great problems facing
any developing nation, including Mexico, is financing
the increased importation of required capital goods.
Mexico’s imports, which currently represent 15 per-
cent of GDP°,have increased at an average annual
rate of 12 percent in the last decade. This rate is not
only higher than that of GDP, but also exceeds export
growth, which has been growing at an average an-
nual rate of only 8 percent. As a result, the balance-
of-payments deficit on current account has been in-
creasing continuously, reaching a peak of $900 million
in 1970.
The increasing trade deficits have been offset by
greater direct foreign investment and loans. Until now
the amount of foreign credit has not only been suffi-
cient to finance the current account deficit, but enough
6
1n the United States this propothon has been approximately
6 percent of GDP in the last three years. This proportion in
Mexico seems high considering that the process of import
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external capital has been received to allow an expan-
sion of the international reserves of the central bank.
Recognizing that the development process itself re-
quires increasing amounts of imports, the only solution
to a trade deficit problem for a developing nation is
to promote exports. Exports of agricultural products
do not provide the long-run solution for Mexico since
they have only been growing at 4 percent annually —
a situation that cannot be expected to change sig-
nificantly given the technical disparity of agricultural
production.7 It is understandable, then, that vigorous
private and public efforts have been directed toward
the promotion of exports of manufactured goods and
to the promotion of tourism.
Eco-nxnnic Poticu Object-men
Mexico, as any developing country, required sub-
stantial public capital formation in the early stages. As
the private capital markets became more developed,
provision for such capital goods has increasingly be-
come the responsibility of the private sector, both
foreign and domestic.
A public policy directed toward capital formation
and better income distribution explains increased
Government involvement in the economy. The im-
portant role of the Government in economic activity
qualifies the Mexican system as a “mixed” or “national”
capitalism. Nevertheless, this participation has not
reached the proportions of other industrial or less
develop-ed countries.
Government intervention in the economic process
through policy decisions has had a long tradition in
Mexico. Policymakers always have been remarkably
sensitive to political and economic forces. Even with-
out sufficient technical kmiowledge, they adopted poli-
cies which allowed Mexico to sustain a continuous
pattern of growth,
Recently more sophisticated techniques have been
used. However, the natural impulse of the policy-
maker still has considerable weight in the final deci-
sions, sometimes invalidating the technical advisors’
recommendations.
Decéloprnen-i air,:! I’rke Sinbll!ir~ ----- it is understand-
able that economic development is, and has been for
some time, the main economic policy objective. In
T
In Mexico, this problem is commonly referred to as the “dual
agriculture” system — one segment utilizing modern fanning





the past this goal was expressed in general terms,
rather than specifically quantified. Presently it is ex-
pressed as a “desired” annual rate of growth in real
GDP betiveen 6 and 7 percent. When adjusted for
population trends, this means a net growth of 3 to 4
percent in per capita terms.
Until 12 years ago no goal other than fulfillment of
development was considered important. Then with
the awareness that continued inflation and drainage
of foreign exchange were inhibiting real growth and
aggravating the pi-oblem of income distribution, the
need for price stability became evident. Beginning in
1955 policymakers introduced price stability as an
ultimate objective to accompany the development
The price stabilization goal pertains to both domes-
tic and international purchasing power; that is, the
rate of growth of domestic prices should not deviate
substantially from its long-run annual trend (3 per-
cent) and the rate of exchange of Mexican currency
should be maintained Accordmg to pobcymakers
both goals should be accomplished under conditions
of free mternal markets and free convertibility of the
peso.
ii ci ( DUS’rI~ Fr — For a long penod this goal
remained of secondary importance. There was a wide
belief that in the long run economic growth and in-
creased savings would eventually raise general in-
come, thereby increasing everyones welfare position
Time has proven that even though the process of
growth with stability has been relatively successful
and the welfare position, on average, has improved,
this actual distribution of income is no better than 15
years ago. One explanation is that promotional meas-
ures directed towards capital formation have implic-
itly encouraged the concentration of income. Promo-
tion of savings and investment through tax exemptions
and subsidies has favored higher over lower income
groups. The unemployment problem also hindered
income distribution as the extensive use of technology
imported from developed countries reduced the do-
mestic demand for Mexico’s most abundant produc-
tive factor — labor.
Therefore, the redistribution of income target has
appeared explicitly in Mexican economic policy. It
remains uncertain whether it is possible to make eco-
nomic growth compatible with greater income equity
and price and exchange rate stability. This problem
is confronted later when the experience of 1971 is
detailed.FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST LOUIS JUNE 1973
Fmplayrner-il — Until recently, this goal was never
explicit in Mexican economic policy. In fact, one
could say that for a long time it was neglected, al-
though a wide consensus concerning the problem has
existed and can be traced in Mexican economic litera-
-ture. Employment now is probably the main concern
regarding fulfillment of the income redistribution goal.
For many years labor market conditions aided in
the goal of price stability. There was an abundant
supply of labor at relatively low salaries. Union power
was, to a certain extent, influenced by the Govern-
ment. These conditions allowed wages to grow slower
than productivity, thereby facilitating price stability.
The situation has changed somewhat since the mid-
l960s because the unions have gained political power,
increasing considerably not only workers’ salaries but
also social and “fringe” benefits. The higher salaries
resulting from the bargaining process, however, have
not been reflected entirely in prices since productivity
has continued to grow at high rates. Moreover, the
benefits of unions are only available to limited
groups of workers, and the supply of unskilled labor
is still large relative to demand.
Eec-ncr-rn--ic Policy In-yt-ni-ments
Fiscal and monetary policy have played an im-
portant role in attaining growth and stability in the
last 15 years. The short-term policy instruments avail-
able to policymakers to fulfill these objectives are
mainly taxes, Government expenditures, and changes
in the supply of money and credit. Import controls
could also be used for this purpose, but such controls
would be rigid and subject to many bureaucratic
processes that would render them extremely ineffi-
dent for short-mn policy,
Fiscal P&h’q ~— Fiscal policy has contributed to both
growth and price stability through different means.
To prevent prices from rising to levels harmful to
low-income groups, price ceilings have been estab-
lished mainly on basic foods, When certain prices
tend to rise above the level set by the controls, the
Government will import such goods and allocate them
in the domestic market, forcing observed prices to re-
main in check,5
In the earlystages of development, high tariffs were
enforced on imports of so-called “luxury” and domes-
t
Price ceilings, although qnitc ineffective in controlling real
price increases, are n valuable political asset in terms of
their effect upon public opinion.
tically-competing goods. The domestic producer was
artificially protected so he could develop a product
competitive in quality and price with that imported.
Advances that were made in the import-substitution
process have reduced the need for protective tariffs,
which are unfavorable to domestic consumers anyway.
The fiscal authorities have also given tax incentives to
new industries by reducing, or in some cases eliminat-
ing, indirect or income taxes.
These measures have indeed promoted growth in
domestic production. However, the main contribution
of fiscal policy has been the pattern of Government
expenditures, which essentially is an autonomous vari-
able. Nevertheless, the approval of each ministry’s
budget is subject to close economic considerations,
especially when it is an investment expenditure. The
views of the Treasury and the central bank are con-
sidered before the budget is sent to Congress for final
approval.
Mrmclarq Falicrj — As mentioned earlier, the higher
rate of growth of expenditures relative to revenue is
annually reflected in Government deficits. Once the
budget is approved the monetary authorities must
decide what sources of funds will be used to finance
the Government deficit, First, an estimate is made of
how much credit will be available from foreign
sources. After this is determined, the rest must be
financed with domestic credit. The external funds
take the form of either loans or foreign investment.
The latter, not available for financing budget deficits,
has been following a steadily growing trend in the
last fifty years.°
Another important source of funds is foreign sav-
ings attracted to the Mexican banking system by the
high rates of interest paid in comparison with inter-
national standards (see the accompanying chart).
The interest rate differential together with the politi-
cal and economic stability that Mexico has attained
in its development process have acted as incentives
for large amounts of savings (estimated growth is
more than 3750 million pesos annually).tm°
0
Sixty percent of this investment, on the average, comes frono
the United States. Although foreign investment is still grow-
ing in absolute terms, the rate of growth has slowed in the
last two years, due mainly to the slower CDP growth experi-
enced in 1971 and to the fact that fewer sectors remain for
new, highly profitable investment, That is, corporate profit
rates, in general, are not as great today as they were twenty-
five years ago. Economic development has reduced returns
on investment, but at the same time has made these returns
less vulnerable to hoge swings in either direction.
°Seethe screened insert to this article for a description of
the Mexican banking system.
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These foreign savings, besides helping to finance
the current account deficit of the balance of payments,
are used to finance budget deficits. Required reserves
on commercial and investment banks must be in-
vested in Government bonds or in selected sectors of
the economy to meet the regulations that govern the
Mexican banking system. Since these legal reserves
are imposed on all the funds that banks receive, the
funds are used for Government financing regardless
of theft origin.’t
Another channel through \vhieh foreign funds are
obtained to finance Government and balance of pay-
ments deficits is short- or long-term loans. These funds
are usually linked to specific Government investment
projects.
If the amount of foreign plus domestic funds avail-
able were enough to finance the Government deficit,
the central bank would be in a neutral position,
neither expanding nor reducing international reserves.
If all of these funds were not enough to finance the
Government deficit, the central bank would have to
consider direct credit to the Treasury, even at the
risk of overstimulating total demand. If the threat of
over-stimulation became very serious, the central
bank would have to take compensatory action on
private credit so that the nation’s overall objectives
would not be endangered. The central bank action
would entail a reduction in bank credit to allow
tm1
Legal reserve requiremnents can be as high as the monetary
authorities decide. On the average, they have been 18% for
commercial banks and 35% for investment banks and non-
monetary liabilities of commercial banks.
Page 20
Mexico’s stock of international reserves to remain un-
changed, thus assuring the goals of stable exchange
rates and free convertibility.
Summing up, one could conclude that Government
expenditures are the main exogenous variable in the
short term. Monetary authorities are left in a rather
compromising situation — either reduce the amount of
funds available to the private sector or lose foreign
exchange.
De-veiop-rne-nt, Foreign E-xchan-ge and P-rice
Stabili-ty — Inco—’npatible Goals?
The objectives described have an inherent tendency
toward disequilibrium. The price stabilization and
development objectives are, to a certain degree, op-
posed when one of these goals is pum-sued vigorously
over the other.
The development goal requires that output grow at
the highest annual rate possible. Government expend-
itures are therefore promoted so that increased total
demand will act as an incentive for private invest-
ment. This level of expenditures promotes an increase
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Present Structure of the Mexican Banking System
The Central Bank (Banco do Mexico) has been Private Financial intermediaries, which account for
the focal point of thr ruonctat ~. s~ stern. Ott the one 70ç~ of total banking I jahi! ities, are divided into the
hand, it perlorriis the I rad not al duties of a centr,d following finictional categatries: a) deposit and say—
bank, such as Lsslnrig curt-cue, supervising the bank~ ings Ii niks, I,) invesitoepit bank’s. c) mortgage loan
ing system at d aclv is lug the Coven uncut on monet-try liii ks, ci) cap tah,at ian banks, and e) I rustec’ ii stitu—
and credit policy. In addition, it has assumed the tions. All these itistituitions operate under the jurisdic—
non—traditional function of redirecting the flow of t ion of the Mitnsl rv of lin’ancc. through the National
credit to spectfic sectors Some met kities, Stwit as Banking ( omnm 551011. The Banc’o dc’ \1exieo is, how—
agneutlitire, h’Lvc cc ,‘eivt’d this preferential treatment (05 Cr, tile Ii mar bank t’gidator.
because’ their rolc in fulfilling the Governments goal
— a) Uk tIe osil and suvmgs banks constifute the
of cli ~‘cJoprneut is genrr.dl regni tIed as t.ssent Ial. framework I tpon wlikb the private bankin g system
‘rhe most important realioc.ttiou of credit, hnss ever, in Mexico rests, Their functions are similar to those of
is a result ot the central bank’s position iii financing .1 c’omtn,’rcial bank n the 1)11 uterI , States. Reflecting
c;O-Vc’mnanent aleficits. Throt igh the mechanism of iega~ the clemai td for the relatively simple instruments
reserve reqilirernc’uts, the centnil batik allocates Coy- ~s’1uc’1i Ibest’ it st liit loris supplied, the deposit and
ernllIC’tit clonicstit: debt in tIe banking system. it e savings hut t ks expc’rieiiced substantial growth between
finids placed on deposit at the co’titral batik for re— 1940 a, d I 9ca. Tot a” the banking structure has
serve requirement pi I rposes are 1 ned to purchase ~ anti thc se bat ks have lost importance In
big!‘—yield Gcn’eni ment bonds. Iii addition to corn- rc’lativc terms. I Lou-ever, t Iid’%’ 5t1h1 hold a luigli voliinic of
mercial banks, the central batik extends the procedure savings in absolute terms.
to the reserves of investment banks also. As a result I)) l)t I diig the last 10 \‘ears the i westment banks,
funds’availahle to Ilic’ Covert merit tI trough reserve ‘ha n eras, base attauied a spectacular growth.
reqnirenicnts reprcsc’nt about 25 to .30¶~ of total Ii- Origi mliv that’ “flu aneier,ls” issued ionL’—term paper.
ahilitirs of the financial s’ stein) Riit the I rong preferetlee of thit’ piubhc for liquid
assets has resulted in the i’snanet- of sight-payable
As is probably i’videt it. the allocation and avail— i mnds earrs lug at I 8.5 p(‘revitt interest rate. As public
ability of en -dit is the prima I’)’ cot cErn of tIle ccnitral confidetIce grew, it \v,Is possible to isctte paper with
hank. Unlike momictan’ policy in liii United States, longer iti;uI 1;rt ies md higli va-Iris, cinh as “certifleaclos
the cost of credit is not given a great deal of attention fij~nnt’ier,,s”These instruments generails pay an inter—
in ~ks co. .\s a result. the level of interest rates in a st rate of TO perceni an nil aIls’ with a 10 year ma-
\~ ~ is at a very reliable indicator of central hank It,ritv. Tbis type of paper expanded rapid]v ft-nm its
Lictis ity. introduction iii 1960 until I ‘169.
The National Credit Institutions a rd those financial ‘l’lIc’ in’,t,thilit) of lie in ten ‘at ion al monetary mar—
iutcrniediaric’s either part]) it svi,ollv owtied by the kets since 1969 has created a greater domestic do—
Gust mmt tit. Although considerably le’s important mnand for highly liqtud paper with high yields. This
than thes 55cr,’ IS ‘cars ago. these in’tittutioi,s still play des elnruuent has pushed thr’ ‘flnaneieras” hack on the
a fundamc’ntal role iti the centtom~ . Thus “crc Oi’igi- nione’ market. instead of the capital market for which
nahl\’ estahli’_hc’d to gise speci.il ptioritv in the alloea’ that- ~vt-re oriL’inallv intended.
tion of dc,mmu’stic- intl foreign credit. Titeir funds han’ c’) i’lmi’ inortgagt’ bank.s are similar in function to
ht.en directed ni,citils to aut ic’ulture. to ‘‘infant indu’-- ~ savig arid loan associations. The mail’ instru—
tries, antI for the proiuotioti iii \t,-xieitu exports. inent.s r’nmplnvc d bs’ these bank—s art’ bonds and
‘‘c-ed’ibis hi1
)otc’c a rias.’’ The Iatter area form of mart—
r’h~-s~’ uislitutions compete with private commercial gage secured riot only by real estate, hut also by the
a,id iccvest itieii t banks for the sayings of the public. giiarat ted’ of isstiiiig tnort gage banks. These unstru—
In :ojchuttoti the’ art’ alltiweci to issue’ debt to the forc’itztt .. rents offer a ,‘oimuhitiatitiu if high liquidity and a
pithilic’. for winch tltc-re’.s ( ,overnntent as.suratic-e of ~ield ay(’r,Lglutg an’tincl S percent.
pavmc ut. Tite fun,ls treeived tire allocated at lower -
in tenc’at rates and I(itager ntat unities tim ‘in th 0cc pre— d The so-cqlled c’apitaiizatitIn banks, originally di’ -
s-ailing itt the mark-ct. sshid, is generally reflected in s’t’lopc’cl to :ttt as savings ihiriks. have bc-cit unable to
a low-er profitah lit” for these banks. I osses incurred eompc’te cit ectivc’lv for funds. As a result. thes’ have
by these just it ut ions are (‘0% c’recl in LI (- Government’s Itot gross a in either nimbi ‘r or total assets.
budget. e) Thc Mexican banking system is snpplemcnted
by a number of fin tnc’ial inst itut ions such as insurance
INonl tanking institntion.s art anotli cm sum ‘cc of funds for curl ipatties. sot-ia! situ rit s t p st Itnids, and othier aux—
financing Government debt. Insurance c and trust diary institutions. These institutiotis either issue finan-
fund organizations, for xamp]e, arc required by lass’ to hold - ‘
a certain portion of their financial ascets in some form of c’ial c hatnis or facditate t hit’ flow- of flilarlejal resouirces
public- debt instrument, between the s’;u’ioiis sad ors of the c’conorns’.
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It is generally assumed that Mexico has a high rate
of unemployment. Consequently, increases in aggre-
gate demand would not affect prices but would pro-
mote production of more real goods and services.
This sometimes is not the case, however, because the
typical unemployed individual is not sufficiently
skilled as to be utilized when more output is desired.
Therefore, price stability and high rates of growth
can be conflicting goals. In order to finance the in-
creased level of Government expenditures, the cen-
tral bank must either create new money or reduce the
amount of credit available to the private sector, If
new money is created in excess of the prevailing
trend, additional pressure is exerted on prices. Con-
sequenfly, the central bank usually prefers to reallo-
cate the sectoral mix of funds received by the banking
system.
The reallocation of funds from the private sector to
the Government reduces private investment and con-
sumption expenditures on goods and services from
what they otherwise would have been. This central
bank action will not affect total spending since the
funds taken from the private sector are spent by the
public sector; only the sectoral mix between private
and public expenditures is altered,12
Growth in real output and investment induced by
increased Government expenditures will lead to a cor-
responding increase in the imports of capital and con-
sumption goods,13 generating pressures on the cur-
rent account of the balance of payments. Exports
cannot respond rapidly in the short run since they are
mainly agricultural and mining products whose low
rates of growth leave a growing deficit that has to be
financed with greater amounts of foreign capital
inflows,
Therefore, the foreign exchange stability goal can
only be accomplished in the short run by reducing
imports. This implies sacrificing the development goal
of economic policy.
Short-term economic policy in Mexico thus requires
considerable “fine tuning” so that both the Govern-
ment and balance-of-payments deficits do not fall out
of a tolerable range, thus invalidating ‘the economic
policy goals.
12Total demand could be affected under these conditions only
if the productivity of the Governments expenditure is con-
siderably different from that of the private sector, In this
case, the Mexican economy as a whole would be worse off
after the sectoral reallocation.
13The marginal propensity to import is greaten for the gov-
ernment than the private sector, and the import demand is
inelastic,
12 Inc Ith c 1t~’ncnCc
By ‘the end of 1970, it was recognized that high
rates of economic growth for more than a decade had
built up a very important destabilizing force in the
economy that could no longer be overlooked. The
current account deficit in the balance of payments sur-
passed $900 million — $200 million more than the level
considered consistent with the other economic policy
objectives. Government deficits had also been grow-
ing constanfly, absorbing larger shares of private bank
savings and deteriorating the structure of the Govern-
ment’s foreign debt position with higher interest rates
and shorter terms of maturity.
These pressures were endangering two of the over-
all goals of economic policy — that is, the stability of
both domestic prices and the rate of exchange. It was
argued also that the failure to attain these goals would
jeopardize the future growth of the Mexican economy
as well as the goals of full employment and more
equitable income distribution,
Also, developments in world markets were exerting
pressures on ‘the Mexican economy. These included
the international financial crisis, a reduction of do-
mestic demand in some industrialized countries, and
inflationary conditions prevailing in international
markets.
Therefore, policymakers decided to stop the “over-
heating” of the economy through a restrictive program
in 1971. Govermnent expenditures were reduced dras-
tically, especially investment expenditures; legal re-
serve requirements were raised; the rate of growth of
money was reduced to an 8.6 percent annual rate from
the average 11 percent of the preceding years; and
more aggressive measures were taken to promote
additional exports and reduce imports.
The results of these measures were felt promptly
and the pressures that threatened the balance of pay-
ments and domestic prices were reduced. However,
the effects on growth surpassed the policymakers’ ex-
pectations as the rate of real GDP growth fell from
7.7 percent in 1970 to 3.7 percent in 1971 — a far more
drastic contraction than was expected. The implicit
price deflator growth rate was reduced from 5 per-
cent in 1970 to only 4 percent by the end of 1971.
The slowing in economic activity permitted imports
to grow only 0.6 percent during 1971 in comparison
with 17,6 percent in 1970, As a result, the current
account deficit was $200 million smaller than that of
1970. Excess reserves of private banks increased by
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more ‘than two billion pesos during the year. The de-
mand for credit was reduced at the prevailing level
of interest rates due to apparent adverse expectations
or increased uncertainty introduced by the “recession.”
In 1972 less restrictive policy actions were adopted
and the economy showed a well-defined move towards
recovery. Prices began increasing moderately and the
outlook for the balance of payments and the Govern-
ment deficit improved. It seems that the political price
the Mexican policymalcers had to pay for this change
in the trend of the Mexican economy was worth the
effort. The question remaining is whether the 1971
experience was a permanent setback or whether struc-
tural changes are required so that the goals of eco-
nomic policy can be reconciled.
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